Ask anything official about AppDefender.dev. I only answer from approved knowledge. I do not invent capabilities, and I do not enforce policy.
Architecture
AppDefender.dev platform
Standalone native security layer. React Native is a thin adapter. Detect and decide on device. Enforce in the Client backend. Launch never waits on the network to know if the app is safe.
Native Security Bridge
The Client installs @appdefenderdev/sdk.react-native and calls a small API. Android and iOS cores own AppDefender, CodeDefender, KeysDefender, CryptoEngine, offline policy, and enforcement.
CLIENT APP (React Native)
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@appdefenderdev/sdk.react-native thin adapter
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Native Security Bridge initialize / launchSecurityCheck / getSecurityState /
protectAction / getDependencyState / getKey
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AppDefender Native Security Core
├── Android (Kotlin + private C/C++ + CryptoEngine)
└── iOS (Swift + private engine + CryptoEngine)Launch Security Gate
APP LAUNCH
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AppDefender.dev SDK
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├── AppDefender root / jailbreak / emulator / debugger / hooking
├── CodeDefender tamper / integrity / anti-Frida / anti-Xposed
├── KeysDefender tokens / API keys / certificates / secrets
├── CryptoEngine SHA-256 / SHA-3, AES-256-GCM, HKDF, Secure Random
├── OfflineThreatHandler signed cached policy + local detection
└── DependencyCallback bridge to React Native
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SECURITY DECISION
├── ALLOW → Authentication → ApiDefender (ATS Lite|Full) → App Features
├── RESTRICT → Limited functionality only
└── BLOCK → Stop launch. Network and tokens cannot override.Core modules
AppDefender.dev
├── AppDefender runtime RASP — root, jailbreak, emulator, debugger, Frida, overlay
├── CodeDefender source/binary — obfuscation, JS/Hermes, anti-RE, anti-tamper
├── KeysDefender secrets — SDK keys, dynamic delivery, rotation, KMS/HSM
└── CryptoEngine SHA-256 / SHA-3, AES-256-GCM, HKDF — native onlyKeysDefender and CryptoEngine
KeysDefender is mandatory for third-party SDK credentials. Super Admin encrypts the secret; the app receives a signed KP1 token; native code unwraps a short-lived copy only after ALLOW. AES keys never enter React Native. Crypto algorithms are a Super Admin policy — SHA-1 is legacy-only.
Offline Threat Handling
Mandatory on every launch. When the device is offline the last securely provisioned policy plus local detection decide ALLOW, BLOCK, or RESTRICT.
ApiDefender / ATS
After ALLOW, every protected route still requires login + access token + attestation. ATS Lite for routine reads. ATS Full for payments and beneficiary changes. TOKEN_IN_BODY is rejected. A clean token cannot override BLOCK.
Control plane and runtime plane
Detect → Assess → Advise → Notify → Remediate → Verify. Super Admin publishes from the Security Advisory Center. Each Client keeps a history of what was detected, when they were notified, and whether the app is protected.
APPDEFENDER.DEV
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CONTROL PLANE RUNTIME PLANE
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Client / app / Native Security SDK
SDK / policy RASP · Anti-tamper
KeysDefender Root / jailbreak
Advisory engine Hook / debug detect
Threat intel Offline launch gate
Notifications Native Security Bridge
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Email / dashboard Android / iOS
Webhook / API │
└────→ Client appTenancy
Super Admin enables Sandbox and/or Production per Client. Client Admin sees only enabled environments. RLS + Go WithScope isolate tenants. Production policy is Maker–Checker.